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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In psychology motivation is defined as a dynamic factor that directs behaviour toward an objective. 
According to Geen (1994), motivation refers to the initiation, direction, intensity and persistence of 
human behaviour. The extrinsic motivation operates when someone engages in a particular behaviour 
for purposes that are extrinsic to the behaviour itself, such as to receive praise, awards, good reviews or 
to avoid unpleasant situations, such as a punishment. In Deci et al. 2008 (p. 12) behaviour motivated by 
extrinsic motivation ‘entails doing an activity because it leads to some outcome that is operationally 
separable from the activity itself. That is, extrinsic motivation concerns activities enacted because they 
are instrumental rather than because one finds the actions satisfying in their own right’. Intrinsic 
motivation, instead, operates when someone engages in behaviour because he finds the activity 
challenging and rewarding in itself, and gets satisfaction in enhancing his competence in that specific 
task.  
Economic literature has devoted some attention to the effect of intrinsic motivation on the 
performance of workers and students, to study the crowding out effect of pecuniary incentives 
(extrinsic motivations). Two effects of increasing rewards can be distinguished: a relative price effect, 
that increases the supply of effort in the activity by lowering the opportunity cost of doing it; a 
crowding-out effect, which reduces the supply of effort by undermining the marginal utility deriving 
from the activity (Frey and Goette, 1999). Frey and Jegen (2001) have formalised the crowding out 
effect in the Motivation crowding theory, but they didn’t explain why derivatives representing crowding 
effects could differ from one person to another and from one situation to another (Harvey, 2005). 
Much empirical evidence on the perverse effects of rewards is available: crowding out effects have been 
detected in supplying working effort (Barkema, 1995), in reciprocating behaviour (Fehr and Gachter, 
2000; Bruni et al., 2009), and in situations where trust (Bohnet, Frey and Huck, 2001) or ‘other 
regarding’ feelings are involved (Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1998)1. 
                                                 
1 See Frey and Jegen (2001) for a review of empirical studies on crowding out effects. 
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Many authors have stressed the relation between the crowding effect of rewards and the perceived 
control effect. Frey and Jegen (2001) identify two psychological processes that affect intrinsic 
motivations: impaired self determination and impaired self esteem. Benabou and Tyrole (2003) use the 
‘looking glass self’ (Cooley, 1902) to show that an agent takes the principal’s perspective in order to 
learn about himself. For the authors, the incentives enhance engaging an activity only if they reveal 
hidden information to the agent, about the task or the agent’s talent, enhancing his confidence about 
himself. They stress that ‘before worrying about the negative impact of rewards, one should first check 
that the reward provider has private information about the task or the agent's talent’ (Benabou and 
Tirole, 2003, p.505). An asymmetric information framework is also in Sliwka model (2007), where 
explanation of crowding out is explicitly ‘distinct from those proposed by psychologist’, and is based on 
the learning of the prevailing social norm, emerging from the incentive scheme proposed by the 
principal.  
In this general framework, the paper aims to reconcile different explanations (and consequences) of the 
motivation crowding theory in a unique theoretical framework, based on the relation between 
motivations and goals and taking into account the self esteem and the self determination mechanisms. 
A distinction between different goals of intrinsic motivation is introduced. Intrinsic motivation is input 
oriented if it is not directed toward the output dimension of the activity. On the other hand, when the 
goal of intrinsic motivation is the output of the activity the intrinsic motivation is output oriented. The 
distinction is relevant because of the different role of self esteem and self determination mechanisms. 
The self determination concerns autonomy and competence of individual effort and affects the input 
dimension of intrinsic motivation. Self esteem arises from the comparison between results (real self) 
and expectations (ideal self) and affects the output dimension of intrinsic motivation. It plays a role 
only when the intrinsic motivation is output oriented, whereas it is not relevant when an activity is 
engaged just for the pleasure to perform the activity itself and the agent doesn’t care about the results 
of his performance. To explicitly model the self esteem and self determination mechanisms, the locus 
of control is introduced in a one period maximisation problem. Throughout the model the intrinsic 
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motivation is assumed as an exogenous psychological attitude that can be more or less highlighted in 
economic behaviour. Differently from some previous models, which will be discussed throughout the 
paper, intrinsic motivation is not a matter of economic choice where individuals choose to behave as 
intrinsic (altruistic) or extrinsic (selfish), according to the best payoff they can afford.  
The paper is organised as follows. In the following section the economic approach to intrinsic 
motivation and the relation between intrinsic motivation and goals will be discussed. In Section 3 the 
role of self esteem, self determination and locus of control in motivation crowding out are examined. 
Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 show the hypotheses and the results of the model for the different goals of 
human behaviour. Some concluding remarks are in Section 8. 
 
2. MOTIVATIONS AND GOALS 
 
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations is based on the relation between motivation 
and the activity performed and/or the individual. Starting from the idea that motivation is a factor that 
activates and directs human behaviour, one can easily classify economic incentives in the category of 
extrinsic motivations, because they are exogenous both to the activity and to the individual.  
On the contrary, any motivation that is endogenous to the individual and/or to his behaviour is 
intrinsic. When motivation is not provided by someone else, is formalised into a feeling and/or is 
strictly linked to the activity performed, it is intrinsic. The effect of the intrinsic motivation is easy to 
recognize when economic theory predicts a very different behaviour: volunteering with a zero wage is 
an example2. Nevertheless, in many other cases it is difficult to ‘differentiate between different sources 
of motivation, which in the economic view are just manifestations of underlying preferences (for the 
task itself, or for the reward that is associated with performing the task)’ (Frey and Jegen, 2001, p.591).  
The authors underline that between the two polar cases of purely extrinsically and purely intrinsically 
induced individuals there is a continuous of combination of the two motivations. To better explain how 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations compete in behaviour orientation it is useful to consider the effect of 
                                                 
2 See Bruno and Fiorillo (2009) for a theoretical model and an empirical investigation of intrinsic motivation role in 
volunteering. 
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more than one goal at a time, as suggested by Lindenberg (2001). Meier and Stutzer (2008) identified 
three kinds of goals of human behaviour that become relevant if intrinsic motivation occurs. Their 
classification is here extended with a fourth kind of goal to include the Benabou and Tirole framework.  
1) Pleasure to perform the task. Strictly following the Deci definition, ‘to be intrinsically motivated 
means to engage in an activity because the activity itself is interesting and enjoyable’ (Deci et al. 
2008, p. 11). Intrinsic motivation directs behaviour toward the pleasure to do something and 
the opportunity to let one’s own competence grow. Being linked to individual preferences and 
to the activity, motivation is intrinsic both to the individual and to the activity. No one else is 
involved. 
2) Desire to succeed in performing the task. From the Benanbou and Tirole perspective, an ‘agent 
will undertake the task only if he has sufficient confidence in his own ability to succeed’ 
(Benabou and Tirole, 2003, p. 491). Intrinsic motivation is identified with the probability to 
succeed, which in turn depends on the agent’s self-confidence, his ability and the difficulty of 
the task. It is intrinsic both to the individual and to the activity. Through the ‘looking glass self’, 
the probability to succeed could be reinforced or crowded out by a principal that, supplying an 
extrinsic motivation, provides information on personal ability and/or the difficulty of the task. 
The extrinsic motivation may be an explicit reward or a public acknowledgement.  
3) The warm glow. An impure form of altruism is what Andreoni (1990) defined the warm glow, 
to point out that people are often ‘motivated by a desire to win prestige, respect, friendship, and 
other social and psychological objectives’ (Olson, 1965). In this respect, motivation is a feeling 
that needs an ex post social approval to be reinforced. Though warm glow is provided by the 
surrounding society, it is intrinsic to the individual and could be intrinsic to the activity. 
4) Social preferences. Social preferences imply that an individual has as objective not only his 
welfare but the other people’s welfare too (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002) and can be interpreted 
as a category of intrinsic motivation: individual choices are directed by an internal emotional 
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goal that regards the welfare of others. Motivation is intrinsic to the individual, for it is 
embedded in his preferences. It could be not intrinsic to the activity. 
Moving from category 1 to 4, one can observe an increasing social involvement of the individual, from 
pure individual gratification, to the need of being accepted at a social level, to the other regarding 
preferences. Moreover, in the first category the intrinsic motivation is not related to the output 
dimension of the activity, and the intrinsic motivation is input oriented. In the last three categories the 
objective of intrinsic motivation is the output of the activity, instead that the activity itself, and the 
intrinsic motivation is output oriented.  
 
3. SELF ESTEEM, SELF DETERMINATION AND LOCUS OF CONTROL 
 
The two psychological processes that are supposed to affect intrinsic motivations are impaired self 
determination and impaired self esteem. 
The first psychological process is well described by the Self determination theory (SDT) by Deci and 
Ryan (2000). Cognitive evaluation theory (CET) was presented by Deci and Ryan (1985) as a sub theory 
within SDT that had the aim of specifying factors that explain variability in intrinsic motivation and 
focus on the fundamental needs for competence and autonomy. According to CET, people must not 
only experience competence or efficacy, they must also experience their behaviour as self determined 
for intrinsic motivation to be evident. Motivation crowding out occurs when a reward affects perceived 
self determination, while the feeling of competence will not affect intrinsic motivation unless 
accompanied by a sense of autonomy (Deci and Ryan, 2000, p. 70). When individuals perceive an 
external intervention as reducing their self determination, intrinsic motivation is substituted by external 
control. Following Rotter (1966), the locus of control shifts from inside to outside (Frey and Jegen, 
2001, p. 594). Locus of control is a term in psychology that refers to individual beliefs about what 
causes the good or bad results in their life, either in general or in a specific area. It can either be internal 
(meaning the persons believe that they control themselves and their life) or external (meaning they 
believe that their environment, some higher power, or other people control their decisions and their 
life). Internals tend to attribute outcomes of events to their own control. Externals attribute outcomes 
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of events to external circumstances. Rotter (1975) cautioned that internality and externality represent 
two ends of a continuum, not an either/or typology. Moreover, Weiner's early work (1974) suggested 
that, orthogonal to the internality-externality dimension, we should also consider differences between 
those who attribute to stable causes, and those who attribute to unstable causes: ability (an internal 
stable cause), effort (an internal unstable cause), task difficulty (an external stable cause) or luck (an 
external, unstable cause). The self determination process is relevant in every category of intrinsic 
motivation goals previously discussed. 
The second psychological process acts when outside intervention carries some information about 
personal competence or the difficulty of the task and it could be either supportive or discouraging. In 
the BT framework the direction of the self esteem mechanism relies on the private information of the 
performer, but also in a symmetric information framework, the self esteem mechanism has relevant 
implication for crowding out. 
Self esteem, considered in a specific dimension, reflects a person’s evaluation of his or her own worth 
in that activity, which in the definition of Branden (1969) derives from ‘the experience of being 
competent … and being worthy of happiness’. In the older definition of James (1890) self esteem is 
higher when there is coincidence between real self and ideal self. While self determination is always 
undermined by an external intervention, the self esteem mechanism can be supportive or discouraging, 
depending on the individual evaluation of his worth in that activity. Therefore, also self esteem is 
associated to the cognitive process where an individual claims his beliefs about what causes the good or 
bad results in their life, that is to say the locus of control. Self esteem can be reduced by the attribution 
of the results to external causes if individual experiences low competence and worthiness, or supported 
when internal causes are highlighted. In more detail, if individuals experience results under their 
expectations, they feel lower self esteem because their real self appears smaller than their ideal self. In 
this situation, a reward shifting the locus from inside to outside by reducing the role of competence will 
induce lower effort. The self esteem mechanism is then discouraging. On the other hand, individuals 
experimenting results over their expectations feel higher self esteem because the real self appears to be 
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greater than their ideal self. A reward shifting the locus from inside to outside will decrease their 
expectation, but feeling very competent to the task and with a good self esteem, they will put more 
effort to counterbalance lower power against external factors. The self esteem mechanism is then 
supportive. 
The self esteem process is important in agent choice if the intrinsic motivation is performance related, 
because correspondence between ideal and real self has a role only when performance have to be 
measured. This happens in categories 2, 3 and 4 above. The pleasure to perform the task should not be 
interested by this mechanism, simply because individual is not interested in his own performance. 
 
4. INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND GOALS: A GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Discussion about intrinsic and extrinsic motivations shows that they concern the shape of the utility 
function and that they direct human behaviour. Basically, depending on the different weight that 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations have in individual preferences, motivations direct behaviour toward 
different variables combination and different goals. Because we can observe only the resulting 
behaviour, not the decision-making process leading to it, it is difficult to discern how the overlapping 
motivations act on the same variables. If different motivations address different goals, it could be useful 
to distinguish in the utility function between intrinsic motivated goods and extrinsic motivated goods. 
Take as an argument of the utility function the amount of time one spends for intrinsic motivation and 
the amount performed for an extrinsic one. The same can be done for market expenditures (goods). 
The preferences are characterised by the weight that motivations have in individual behaviour. The 
arguments of the utility function are consumption goods (C), which contribute to higher material 
welfare (I feel good because I’ve got many assets) and the correspondent amount (D) that impacts on 
the emotional well being (I feel good because I’ve given many gifts, donations and so on). In the same 
way, time can be used to reach a material purpose (by consuming pure leisure T) or an intrinsically 
motivated objective (Y) which provides an output without any other explicit formalisation than a 
feeling, like the pleasure to perform a task, the desire to succeed in performing a task, the warm glow 
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deriving from an activity or the others’ satisfaction deriving from an activity. The motivated output Y is 
produced through A, that is the individual effort, measured in units of time. The specific functional 
relation between Y and A will describe how the motivated good (the goal) is linked to the time spent to 
produce it (the input). This relation depends on the specific goal individual pursues: when input oriented 
motivations are concerned, the relation between units of time and goals can be affected only by the self 
determination process whereas, when output oriented motivations occur, also the self esteem process 
impacts on the productivity of effort. 
According to the locus of control theory, each individual has an external-internal belief on what 
influences his performance Y. Let us denote K the individual belief that internal variables influence Y 
(locus of control) so that Y=Y(A,K). 
Denote γ the weight intrinsic motivation has in directing individual behaviour and 1-γ the 
corresponding weight of extrinsic motivation, parameters describing the individual preferences. A 
Cobb Douglas utility function is summarised in (1). 
[ ] [ ]1 ( , )U CT Y A K Dγ γ−=           (1)
s.t. 
Tx = T + A + L
D + C = wL + X + hwA
 
where L is labour time, w is wage, X is non labour income, Tx is the maximum available time and 
0<h<1 is the ratio of the reward for the activity A with respect to wage. 
CET Theory states that intrinsic motivation is much in evidence if the individual can experience some 
autonomy. When individuals perceive an external intervention as reducing their self determination, 
intrinsic motivation is substituted by external control. To include the effect on locus of control of an 
external intervention represented by a reward, consider K as a function of two distinct factors: the 
individual inclination for internal locus k and the control effect on self determination represented by a reward, 
so that K(h, k). With subscript denoting partial derivatives, the following Assumptions are formulated. 
Assumption 1: 0;     0k hK K> < . 
The Assumption states that the control effect of increasing rewards has a negative impact on self 
determination and that the external intervention is always perceived as reducing self determination. 
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This could be not always true, but it is useful to show how motivation could be crowded in, also in the 
worst hypothesis. The individual inclination has a positive effect on self determination. 
Assumption 2:  0,   0.K AY Y> >  
The Assumption states that the individual belief that internal variables influence Y, i.e. self 
determination K, has a positive impact on the motivated object Y. Consequently, from assumption 1 
derives that the individual inclination for internal locus has a positive effect on the motivated object: 
individuals with higher internal locus of control tend to attribute outcomes of events to their own 
control and feel higher self determination; this enhances the satisfaction coming from intrinsic 
motivated activity. On the other hand, if the control effect of increasing rewards has a negative impact on 
self determination, higher rewards will correspond to lower levels of the motivated object Y. Finally, 
more time spent in the activity increases the production of the motivated good. 
Based on the previous assumption, the following explicit form for self determination will be used: 
K = β(1− h)α   (2) 
 where α and β are parameters describing the sensitivity of self determination to rewards or the 
individual inclination for the internal locus k. With α=1 every reward increase reduces internal belief in 
the same way. If α>1 growing rewards undermine the internal locus more than proportionally. These 
alternatives can be discussed as different degrees of self determination sensitivity to rewards.  
 
5. INTRINSIC MOTIVATION ‘INPUT ORIENTED’: THE PLEASURE TO DO 
 
When intrinsic motivation concerns the pleasure to do something and the opportunity to let one’s own 
competence grow, the individual is interested only in doing the activity and learning by it. His 
satisfaction does not depend on the difficulty of the task or on his ability to perform it, as it would 
happen if he was interested in the good result of his activity. The self esteem mechanism has no role in 
the pleasure resulting from an activity such as going jogging in the morning, reading a book, listening to 
music or having sex.  
The effects of the self determination process depend on the specific activity performed and on the 
relation between time spent in the activity and the marginal productivity of enjoyment. If self 
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determination directly supports the pleasure to do something, the individual feels autonomy as a part of 
his pleasure (I’m pleased in doing that by myself). Autonomy is a source of enjoyment and intrinsic.  
A reward offered in this situation undermines the pleasure deriving from the time spent in the 
motivated activity, but for any reward and any level of effort, the intrinsic motivation is not crowded 
out by a reward increase because the price effect makes effort cheaper and the control effect undermine 
pleasure but does not make effort less productive. Consider as motivated output reading books. My 
father gives me a reward for any hour spent in reading books. I feel my self-determination threatened, 
because I’d be happier reading without a reward, but the marginal pleasure deriving from reading is 
always the same. As a whole, taking into account that with a higher reward I can purchase more books, 
I’ll spend more time reading books. 
If self determination supports the efficacy of effort in doing something (the marginal productivity of 
effort), individual experiences competence or efficacy as self determined and they grow with self 
determination (I’m pleased in doing that and I’m able to do it by myself). The marginal pleasure of 
effort increases with self determination.  Crowding out could emerge depending on the sensitivity of 
self determination to reward variations (the value of α) because the price effect makes effort cheaper 
but, at the same time, the control effect make it less productive and the two effects conflict. Consider 
as motivated output having sex with someone. What effect will payment have for every appointment? 
If I feel that my self-determination is threatened, it is reasonable that my marginal pleasure in each 
appointment is lessened because I feel that my efficacy is not self determined. Than, it could happen 
that I’ll reduce my appointments when a very high reward is offered. 
The second definition is closer to the CET theory, whereas the first one is closer to some features of 
the ‘enjoyment’ described by Lindenberg (2001). Different sensitivity of self determination to rewards 
determine the direction of the crowding. 
 
 
6. INTRINSIC MOTIVATION ‘OUTPUT ORIENTED’: THE PROBABILITY TO 
SUCCEED 
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If the individual is intrinsically motivated to succeed in performing a task, the intrinsic motivation is 
output oriented and the motivated good is the probability to succeed. The probability to succeed is 
considered a subjective estimate of the probability of an event (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972), based 
on the locus of control. Individual beliefs about what causes the good or bad results, i.e. the locus of 
control,  is formalised through the expectation about the functional relation determining Y: it is a 
function of internal variables if it depends on ability (S), an internal stable cause, and time devoted to 
the activity (A), an internal unstable cause; on the other hand, the variables determining Y are external 
if the functional relation is Y(θ, σ), where θ represents task simplicity (stable) and σ good luck (unstable). 
Each variable has a positive effect on Y. Therefore, the motivated good is an expected value E(Y), 
based on the individual belief K that internal variables influence Y.  
E(Y ) = KAS + (1− K )σθ           (3) 
where to simplify algebra Y(θ, σ)= θσ and Y(S,A)=SA.  
When motivation is output oriented the self esteem mechanism comes into evidence in shaping utility. 
Individuals feel high self esteem if they experience a real self greater than their ideal self. Here, the ideal 
self is the expected result, whereas the real self is the ex post result of individual effort Y(S,A). When 
the individual chooses an optimal level of effort corresponding to an ideal self smaller than the result 
really affordable by exerting that level of effort (the real self), then:  
( )* 1 *    *KA S K A S A Sσθ σθ+ − < → >         (4)  
while if the individual experiences a real self lower than the ideal self: 
( )* 1 *    *KA S K A S A Sσθ σθ+ − > → <         (5) 
With the introduction of a monetary incentive, individuals perceive an external intervention reducing 
their self determination. As a consequence of the external intervention, the expectation about what 
causes good or bad results changes. Individual feels lower self determination and attributes his 
performance to external factors more than to internal factors. The control effect of the reward 
increases the perceived importance of luck and task simplicity, whereas the role of effort and ability 
decreases. The overall effect on the expected result (the ideal self) will depend on the relation between 
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internal and external variables. The reaction to a higher feeling of incompetence (or lower self 
determination) could be a lower or higher effort, depending on how self esteem works. 
Consider first an expected self lower than the real self, as in (4). By experiencing results beyond 
expectations, the individual feels increasing self-esteem. A reward shifting the locus from inside to 
outside will further decrease the probability to succeed3 and the corresponding ideal self, making more 
evident the positive experience of self esteem. The self esteem mechanism is then supportive.  
On the other hand, the self esteem mechanism is discouraging, when the weight of internal variables is 
lower than that of the external ones and the ideal self is greater than the real self, as in (5). In this 
situation individuals experience decreasing self esteem. A reward, shifting the locus from inside to 
outside, will increase their expectation4, confirming that their competence and their effort are not 
important in determining results. The self esteem mechanism is then discouraging. 
The effect of the simultaneous action of self esteem and self determination on the optimal amount of 
time spent in the activity depends on the relative contribution of internal/external variables. 
Proposition 1:  
When intrinsic motivation is directed toward the probability to succeed in a specific task, motivation 
crowding in will occur when the individual has high motivation, high potential income and high 
competence. The crowding in condition, by using the explicit form of K in (2), is  
A0
B
>
α
β 1− h( )
1−α
           ( 6) 
where A0 =
γ (wTx + X )
2w
 is the effort at zero reward, and B =
σθ
S
1 − γ
2




.  
Proof:  see Appendix. 
The relative contribution of internal/external variables is a key factor in determining crowding direction 
because it describes the proportion between the individual contribution to the probability (the time he 
would spend in the activity without locus and productivity implications) and the contribution of 
external variables. A highly motivated individual, with high competence in the task and high potential 
                                                 
3
 The derivative of E(Y) with respect to K is positive if AS>σθ. 
4
 The derivative of E(Y) with respect to K is negative if AS<σθ. 
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income, would resist to the undermining effect of rewards better than someone with low levels of 
competence, motivation and income. On the other hand, an individual could be more easily crowded 
out in a simpler task or in a lucky situation than when the activity is very difficult or unlucky conditions 
occur. The rationale for this is in the self esteem mechanism. In a difficult task, the agent chooses a 
higher effort5 and has a lower expectation of success. An increase of self esteem will come back by 
comparing expectations and results. The reward will be supportive in an unlucky or difficult task 
because, by shifting the locus from inside to outside, it further reduces the expectation, enhancing 
effort. A reward offered in a very simply task, instead, is perceived as discouraging if it is not 
proportional to the task; the agent who expects easy situations puts lower effort and has higher 
expectations. The results are more frequently below his expectations. A growing reward further 
decreases the role of competence he perceives and effort is reduced.  
In this perspective, the Benabou and Tyrole framework gives further implications if two conditions for 
crowding out occur, that is when ‘the agent is less knowledgeable in some dimensions than the 
principal’ and ‘the principal must be more inclined to offer a reward when the agent has limited ability 
or the task is unattractive’ (Benabou and Tyrole, 2003, p.492). In the present framework, crowding out 
may occur also with symmetric information, and the principal’s preferences have no role. Uncertainty 
works through the individual locus of control and the crowding out emerges if the locus decreases with 
external intervention.  
Consider for instance the goals of a researcher. If he is output oriented, he cares about the probability 
of success of his research and is interested in the probability of publication. His goal is a good and 
successful research. The publication in a top journal is a very difficult task, with low probability to 
succeed. Two researchers with the same ability and motivation, but different locus of control, can react 
differently to a positive and quick review (a high reward). Assume that researcher 1 is an internal type 
and that he attributes the outcomes of the submission to his own effort, whereas researcher 2 thinks 
that acceptation depends on external circumstances, such as research networks, the choice of 
fashionable issues or less risky results. In a very difficult task, the internal researcher will exert a great 
                                                 
5 The derivative of optimal effort with respect to external variables is negative.  
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bulk of effort in the research (suppose *A S σθ> ), whereas for the other researcher *A S σθ< . The 
quick and positive review will have different effects on their future research effort. The internal 
researcher 1, testing a real self greater than his ideal self, feels a supportive enhancement of self esteem 
and he will increase his research effort because he trusts in his effort and competence.  Researcher 2, 
who is further convinced by the reward that publication is a matter of luck, will lower his effort because 
the reward, shifting the locus from inside to outside, confirms that his competence is not so important 
in determining results. 
The self determination sensitivity plays an important role in the relation between crowding out and the 
size of the reward. Consider the simplest form of K with β=1.  
The α=1 hypothesis implies that a growing reward reduces internal belief proportionally. For A0 > B , 
the individual will be always crowded in, because supportive self esteem always offsets a lower self 
determination, while the crowding out will occur if the opposite is verified, because self esteem and self 
determination have the same direction. When 0A B= , the agent always exerts the level of effort 
corresponding to no reward, because the self esteem support exactly counterbalances the undermined 
self determination. Therefore, the crowding direction strictly depends on the value of A0 (the effort 
without reward) and its relation with external factors, that is on the self esteem mechanism. The 
exogenous variables (psychological and economic) univocally determine the crowding direction and the 
size of reward is irrelevant.  
To illustrate these results, let’s come back to the two researchers and their publications. In the 
hypothesis of constant self determination sensitivity, the researcher will react in the same way regardless 
the journal accepting the paper. A highly motivated researcher chooses a high level of effort before 
receiving any reward ( A0 > B ). A positive review, whatever journal will make it, will enhance his effort.  
The researcher poorly motivated (or low skilled) will reduce his effort after the publication because the 
reward will lessen his belief about the relevance of internal factors as effort and skill.  
For the same self determination sensitivity (α=1) and β=k, the right hand side of crowding condition 
becomes equal to 1/k. This combination of hypothesis allows us to deeply discuss the influence of 
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psychological attitudes on motivation crowding. Consider the combinations of locus of control and 
intrinsic motivation that allow respectively the crowding out or the crowding in situations. Couples of γ 
and k that ensure a stable value of A are described by the following equation. 
k = w(2 − γ )σθ
γ (wTx + X)S
           (7) 
that is decreasing in γ.  
 
With increasing rewards, individuals with high intrinsic motivation reduce time in intrinsic motivated 
activity if their natural locus of control k is relatively low. They easily perceive that reward attempts to 
their autonomy, because they are not self determined and they attribute outcomes of events to external 
circumstances: a growing reward, that is external, intensifies this attribution. On the contrary, internals 
will intensify effort in the activity with increasing rewards, also with lower intrinsic motivation, because 
they are highly confident in their own ability and they perceive growing rewards as an assessment of it.  
On the other hand, highly motivated individuals will be always crowded in, unless of a low locus of 
control. They give much weight to intrinsic motivated production, independently from the factors 
determining it. The highly motivated individual faces an increasing reward as an enlargement of his 
income possibility to consume it. In the two researchers’ example this situation corresponds to two 
researchers with the same ability and locus, but with different motivation. The highly motivated 
researcher will increase his research effort because the published paper enlarges his research 
possibilities, making them more reliable. The low motivated researcher will be discouraged by the easy 
result and will lower his effort because he is not really interested in research.  
Finally, the hypothesis that self determination sensitivity implies growing reduction of locus can be 
discussed (α>1). Consider α=1/k and β=1. The crowding condition is expressed by 
A0
B
>
1
k
1
1− h




1− k
k
           (8) 
When the self determination sensitivity implies growing reduction of locus, the appearance of crowding 
out depends both on the size of the reward and on the ratio between internal and external variables, 
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reflecting the self esteem mechanism. Higher individual inclination for internal locus will make the 
individual more resistant to the undermining effects of rewards, and higher intrinsic motivation will do 
the same. The crowding out would occur, when lower rewards are offered, also for low potential 
income individuals or when activity entails easy task, depending on the relative strength of locus and 
intrinsic motivation. 
  
7. INTRINSIC MOTIVATION ‘OUTPUT ORIENTED’: THE PRINCIPAL’S 
PAYOFF 
 
As discussed above, psychological literature suggests that motivation crowding out occurs when a 
reward affects perceived self determination. The perception of external intervention (K) has been 
expressed as a function of the size of reward, while the individual psychological characteristic is 
represented by the individual locus of control (k). Other conditions may alter the perception intensity 
of external intervention.  Harvey (2005) showed that extrinsic rewards might be perceived as 
controlling if two conditions occur: a large size of the reward and the coincidence between the object 
of an agent’s intrinsic motivation and the source of his rewards. The first condition has been discussed 
above, while the second needs a slight modification of the objective of intrinsic motivation.  
In the proposed classification of goals, social preferences can be interpreted as a category of intrinsic 
motivation if an individual has as objective not only his welfare but the other’s welfare too. If the 
other’s welfare is the source of intrinsic motivation, utility will be a direct function of the other’s utility.  
U = CT( )1−γ UoD( )γ             (9) 
where Uo is the other’s utility. The condition described by Harvey is a special case of intrinsic 
motivation induced by social preferences, where Uo is the principal’s profit. The social preferences 
framework has been modelled also by Sliwka (2007), with selfish agents compared with fair agents, who 
care for the principal’s payoff, and conformist agents, who behave alternatively as selfish or fair, 
depending on how the largest fraction of population behave. Asymmetric information is assumed about 
the type of the agent and the distribution of types in the population. A social preferences hypothesis is 
also in Bolle and Otto (2010), where a linear relation between individual utility and others’ utility is 
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assumed. The intrinsic motivation to the other’s welfare depends on the value of the good the other 
receives and not on the good itself: the individual estimation of this value is assumed higher than the 
signal he learns from the reward and the crowding out could occur if the signal is too low. 
When the agent cares about other’s utility, the intrinsic motivation is directed toward the result of the 
activity. The agent has an expectation about his performance based on the personal belief about the 
functional relation determining his principal’s payoff. Uo is a function of internal variables if it depends 
on ability and time devoted to the activity, minus the reward the agent perceives. On the other side, the 
variables determining Uo are external if the principal’s profit depends on task simplicity and good luck. 
The principal’s payoff is described in (10): 
U0 = K AS − hwA( )+ 1− K( )σθ          (10) 
Proposition 2:  
When intrinsic motivation is directed toward the principal’s payoff, the crowding in condition, by using 
the explicit form of K in (2), with α=1 and β=1, is  
[ ]
2
0
2
( )
 
A S h w S
B S wh
−
>
−            ( 11)
 
Proof:  see Appendix. 
Compared with the probability to succeed hypothesis, with a constant self determination sensitivity, an 
internal highly motivated, that would be crowded in for any reward, will be still crowded in with very 
low rewards. But with growing control, the agent who has a stake in principal’s payoff will be crowded 
out. The explanation for an easier crowding out relies again on the self esteem mechanism. Also where 
the reward is perceived as supportive, because the agent experiences results over his expectations, an 
additional effect of reward must be taken into account. By reducing the principal’s payoff, the reward 
acts directly on the internal variables contribution: it reduces their perceived weight, through 
undermined self determination, but reduces also their real weight, through a higher cost for the 
principal. While the expectation is reduced proportionally to the self determination parameter, the real 
self is reduced of the whole higher cost. Consequently, the real self (the principal’s payoff) decreases 
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with rewards faster than the ideal self, because of the imperfect psychological perception. An individual 
experiencing high self esteem with low rewards, can experiment low self esteem with higher rewards 
because he underestimates the role of costs in profit function.  
This result is quite similar to other results in the existing literature, where a higher reward is a condition 
for crowding out, but with a different explanation. In the Harvey (2005) framework, the perfect 
substitutability between intrinsic and extrinsic goals shifts choices from intrinsic to extrinsic behaviour, 
because individuals choose to behave ‘as if’ being intrinsically or extrinsically motivated according to 
the situation that gives a higher welfare. The size of the reward is determinant for the shift from one 
goal to another. In the Sliwka (2007) signalling game, the trust/control strategy of the principal is not 
related to the reward size and the conformist agent chooses to behave ‘as if’ being selfish or fair by 
learning the prevailing social norm. Bolle and Otto (2010) find that the reward size is relevant for 
crowding out because the individual estimation of the value of goods is substituted by the (lower) 
market signal when a reward is offered. The subjective psychological attitude toward the other is 
replaced by a market evaluation.  
Here, individual intrinsic motivation can be more or less enlightened by the simultaneous work of self 
determination and self esteem mechanism, but the motivation is not ruled out by an opportunistic 
evaluation of benefits deriving from the motivated action. In other words, intrinsic motivation is 
considered as a psychological attitude of the individual, exogenous to the economic behaviour, where it 
can become more or less evident. 
 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Taking into account that intrinsic motivation is a psychological issue whose relevance in economics has 
already been addressed, the paper presents a model where some relevant psychological mechanisms are 
explicitly modelled in order to explain how the self esteem and the self determination mechanisms 
affect the intrinsic motivation. Both mechanisms are associated to the cognitive process where an 
individual claims his beliefs about what causes the good or bad results in his own life that is the locus 
of control. The self determination concerns autonomy and competence of individual effort and affects 
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the input dimension of intrinsic motivation. Self esteem arises from the comparison between results 
(real self) and expectations (ideal self) and affects the output dimension of intrinsic motivation. 
Therefore, the analysis is based on the different effect of the self esteem mechanism on intrinsic 
motivation input oriented or output oriented. 
The intrinsic motivation is input oriented when it is not related to the output dimension of the activity. In 
this situation, motivation cannot be affected by impaired self esteem. If an activity is engaged just for 
the pleasure to perform the activity itself, the agent doesn’t care about the results of his performance. 
The effects of rewards on motivation depend on how the self determination sensitivity affects the 
marginal productivity of pleasure, that is when self determination enlightens the role of intrinsic 
motivation by putting in evidence individual competence. This implication is coherent with the 
statement of cognitive evaluation theory about the need for competence and autonomy for intrinsic 
motivation to be in evidence. 
When the agent is motivated to succeed in performing a task, he is output oriented and the self esteem 
effect must be taken into account. With constant self determination sensitivity, the crowding out could 
emerge if the individual experiences very low self esteem but the crowding direction does not depend 
on the size of the reward. The exogenous variables (psychological and economic) univocally determine 
the crowding direction. When growing self determination sensitivity is assumed, also the reward size 
determines crowding direction. 
Finally, when the individual is motivated to pursue the principal’s payoff, more occasions for crowding 
out of intrinsic motivation may occur because of the imperfect estimation of the cost effect on 
principal’s profit, that progressively undermines his self esteem. 
Throughout the model, the intrinsic motivation is assumed as an exogenous psychological attitude that 
can be more or less highlighted in economic behaviour. Differently from some previous models, 
intrinsic motivation is not a matter of economic choice where individuals choose to behave as intrinsic 
(altruistic) or extrinsic (selfish), according to the best payoff they can afford.  
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Further research is needed to define the variability of self determination sensitivity or its better 
functional form, but the distinction among different goals of motivation can be useful to distinguish 
the effects of rewards. The theoretical framework here proposed can be tested in experiments that 
should take into account the above distinction. 
 
 22 
 APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
The optimal value for A is: 
( ) ( )2( ) ( )1 1*         if     2
2 (1 ) 2 (1 )
x xwT X wT XK KA
w h S K w h S K
γγ γσθ σθ γ−+ +− −= − > −
− −
   (A1) 
     =0  otherwise 
where the first addend is the standard leisure time and the second addend represents the perceived 
weight of external variables in the production of the motivated good. The derivative of A* with respect 
to the reward is: 
∂A *
∂h =
γ (wTx + X)
2w(1− h)2 +
σθ
S
K '
K 2
1− γ
2




        (A2) 
A growing reward reduces the opportunity cost of intrinsic goods with respect to the extrinsic ones, 
increasing A, through price effect, and increases the weight (reduces autonomy) of exogenous factors, 
reducing A, through external effect. The external effect modifies A through two channels: a negative 
direct external effect, due to the share of motivated good production that is independent from A and 
exogenously determined by task difficulty and luck; and a positive indirect external effect, capturing 
how exogenous ‘endowment’ of Y is redistributed between goods. The total external effect is always 
negative on A, because redistribution of exogenous ‘endowment’ is spread over all intrinsic and 
extrinsic goods and only a part (γ/2) of exogenous contribution to Y is redistributed on A. 
While internal locus reduces total external effect, the intrinsic motivation has a positive effect both on 
the indirect part of external effect (the positive one) and on the price effect. Therefore, a more 
intensive motivation, by increasing the positive impact of external factors, reduces the overall negative 
impact of external effect. Intuition behind this result relies on the different role of intrinsic motivation 
and locus of control. Locus determines if the effect of external variables on intrinsic activity is strong or 
weak, while the absolute weight of intrinsic activity depends on motivation.  
By using the explicit form of K in (2), the crowding in condition 
* 0A
h
∂
>
∂
is: 
1( ) (1 )(2 )
xwT X h
w
αγ α
σθ γ β
−
+
> −
−
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  
Consider again the simplest form of K, with α=1 and β=1. The optimal value for A is 
A* = γ (wTm + X)
2w 1 − h( ) −
h
(1− h)(S − hw)






(2 − γ )θσ
2
       (A3) 
      
 
where 
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h
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>
∂
 if   
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S − wh[ ]2        
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